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Abstract: There is now a great deal of evidence that norm violations impact people’s causal 
judgments. But it remains contentious how best to explain these findings. This includes that the 
primary explanations on offer differ with regard to how broad they take the phenomenon to be. In 
this chapter, I detail how the explanations diverge with respect to the expected scope of the contexts 
in which the effect arises, the types of judgments at issue, and the range of norms involved. In 
doing so, I briefly summarize the evidence favoring my preferred explanation—the responsibility 
account. I then add to the evidence, presenting the results of two preregistered studies that employ a 
novel method: participants were asked to rank order compound statements combining a causal 




In this chapter, I lay out and defend one type of explanation of recent findings that norms impact 
people’s causal judgments—the responsibility account (e.g., Sytsma et al. 2012, Livengood et al. 
2017, Sytsma et al. 2019, Livengood and Sytsma 2020, Sytsma forthcoming-a, Sytsma and 
Livengood forthcoming). To do so I will critically contrast this view with three other prominent 
types of explanation that have been put forward in the literature—the pragmatic account (e.g., 
Samland and Waldmann 2016, Samland et al. 2016), the bias account (e.g., Alicke 1992, 2000; 
Alicke et al. 2011; Rose 2017), and counterfactual accounts (e.g., Hitchcock and Knobe 2009, 
Halpern and Hitchcock 2015, Kominsky et al. 2015, Icard et al. 2017, Kominsky and Phillips 
2019). The contrast is not straightforward, however, because while each of these views purports to 
explain the same basic findings, they arguably diverge in how they construe the broader 
phenomenon to be explained, and this is tied to the type of explanation offered.  
 
1 Forthcoming in Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Causation, P. Willemsen and A. Wiegmann (eds.), 
Bloomsbury. I want to thank Pascale Willemsen and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on a previous 
draft of this chapter and Jonathan Livengood for suggestions in the early stage of this project. 
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 To draw this out, consider the Pen Case first presented by Knobe and Fraser (2008), which 
has been widely offered as an illustrative example of the phenomenon in the subsequent literature. 
Participants were given the following vignette: 
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. The 
administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens, but faculty members are supposed 
to buy their own. 
 
The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty 
members. The receptionist has repeatedly e-mailed them reminders that only 
administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens. 
 
On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor Smith 
walking past the receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs 
to take an important message… but she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk. 
 
In this scenario, two agents perform symmetric actions (both Professor Smith and the 
administrative assistant take pens) that jointly lead to a problem. The key difference is that one 
agent violates a norm (Professor Smith is not allowed to take pens) while the other does not 
(administrative assistants are allowed to take pens). After reading this vignette, participants were 
then asked to rate their agreement with two statements using a scale ranging from -3 (“not at 
all”) to 3 (“fully”): 
Professor Smith caused the problem. 
The administrative assistant caused the problem. 
 
Knobe and Fraser found that overall participants agreed far more strongly with the first claim 
(M=2.2) than with the second (M=-1.2). Call this the norm effect.  
 Each of the accounts in the literature purports to explain the norm effect. But what exactly is 
the scope of this effect? Focusing on the Pen Case, we can offer a minimal characterization of the 
basic phenomenon. First, Knobe and Fraser report the results of an empirical study that limited the 
“conversation” between experimenter and participant in notable ways, including that the 
participant’s contribution to the conversation was restricted to rating the two statements. Minimally, 
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the norm effect can be construed as being specific to such contexts, reflecting pragmatic factors 
owing to the experimental setup. Second, the statements that participants rated used the lemma 
“cause,” having the form “X caused Y.” Minimally, the norm effect can be construed as being 
specific to attributions employing this lemma. Third, in the Pen Case vignette the norm that 
Professor Smith violates is an explicit departmental rule: she takes a pen even though she was not 
allowed to do so. Minimally, the norm effect can be construed as being specific to norm violations 
of this type.2  
 The main types of explanation offered in the literature differ along one or more of these 
three dimensions, and so differ in how broad they ultimately take the norm effect to be. In this 
chapter, I detail these differences through the lens of my preferred explanation—the responsibility 
account. I begin by characterizing the phenomenon at issue, noting disagreements about the scope 
of the norm effect, focusing on how restricted the context for the effect is taken to be (Section 1), 
the scope of the judgments at issues (Section 2), and the range of norms involved (Section 3). In 
doing so, I’ll lay out the primary alternative explanations of the norm effect that have been offered 
and very briefly summarize some of the recent evidence suggesting in favor of the responsibility 
account. In Section 4, I then add to this, reporting the results of two new, preregistered studies using 





2 Further distinctions can be drawn, although I’ll focus on these three. Most notably, focusing on the form “X caused 
Y,” in the Pen Case the X’s are agents and the Y is a bad outcome. Work has varied both of these factors, however. 
With regard to X, the effect has also been found for non-agents (e.g., Hitchcock and Knobe 2009, Sytsma 
forthcoming-b) and for statements involving an agent’s action or decision (e.g., Hitchcock and Knobe 2009, 
Livengood et al. 2017). And with regard to Y, while the effect has been reported for good outcomes (e.g., Hitchcock 
and Knobe 2009, Kominsky et al. 2015), it has also been shown that it can be reversed with ratings being higher for 




Most of the explanations of the impact of norms on causal judgments that have been offered in 
the literature take this to be a general phenomenon that is revealed by the empirical studies, not 
an artifact created by the context of the studies themselves. The pragmatic account put forward 
by Samland and Waldmann challenges this assumption. Samland and Waldmann (2016) claim 
that the term “cause” can be understood in two different ways, one corresponding with what they 
refer to as causality and the other with accountability. While they offer a rather circular 
definition of “causality” that would require a good bit of unpacking—i.e., “causality in the 
narrow sense refers to contingent dependency relations between causes and effects that are 
generated by causal mechanisms” (165)—the key distinction here is that it is taken to be purely 
descriptive, while accountability is taken to be sensitive to normative considerations. Samland 
and Waldmann then argue that in studies showing the norm effect, “pragmatic contextual 
features steer subjects toward an accountability understanding of the causal test question” (165).  
The most straightforward interpretation of Samland and Waldmann’s view is that the 
dominant attributional use of the lemma “cause” expresses a purely descriptive concept (causality), 
but that in contexts like that found in Knobe and Fraser’s study using the Pen Case, pragmatic 
factors lead participants to instead interpret the queries as asking for a judgment that is sensitive to 
normative considerations. Samland and Waldmann write that “the ambiguity of queries about the 
cause in scenarios demonstrating norm effects is grounded in the presupposition relation between 
accountability and causation,” which is such that “agents are only held accountable for outcomes 
they have caused” (165). They then note that in in the Pen Case “the causal relations are trivial,” 
such that “it is unlikely that subjects will think that they are supposed to solely judge this causal 
relation” (165). What this suggests is not so much that Samland and Waldmann hold that the term 
5 
 
“caused” is polysemous, but that in rather specific contexts they expect people to infer that the 
experimenters were actually interested in another concept altogether—one that presupposes relevant 
descriptive relations, but where information about norm violations is also relevant. The upshot is 
that according to the pragmatic account, studies showing the impact of norms on causal judgments 
miss their intended mark: they don’t actually tell us anything about ordinary causal judgments.  
Our responsibility account is in some ways similar to Samland and Waldmann’s pragmatic 
account. Both views explain the norm effect in terms of participants taking the test statements to 
express a normative concept. While the pragmatic account holds that this is due to participants 
taking the statements to be intending to ask about something other than who caused the outcome, 
however, the responsibility account denies this. We contend that participants do in fact take the 
statements to be asking about who caused the outcome, but believe that the dominant use of 
“caused” in such statements expresses a normative concept. Specifically, we hold that the concept 
of causation expressed by the dominant attributional use of the lemma “cause,” at least in English, 
is sensitive to both descriptive and normative considerations, being akin to concepts like 
responsibility and accountability. In this way, the responsibility account takes the norm effect to be 
notably broader than the pragmatic account does with regard to context: we hold that this is a 
general phenomenon, not one that is specific to the experimental contexts.  
The responsibility account predicts that people’s judgments about causal attributions 
(statements like “X caused Y”) will generally be quite similar to their judgments about normative 
attributions such as responsibility attributions (statements like “X is responsible for Y”). And there 
is evidence for this claim both from corpus studies and experimental studies. First, Sytsma et al. 
(2019) present evidence suggesting that the dominant attributional use of “caused” as found in the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English is sensitive to normative information, being similar to 
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the attributional use of “responsible” in this regard. Unlike other terms that plausibly express 
descriptive “causality” (such as “created,” “induced,” “led to”), “caused” and “responsible” tend to 
be disproportionately used in the context of negatively valenced outcomes, and a distributional 
semantic analysis shows that they are remarkably close together in semantic space. Such findings 
for ordinary English usage suggest against the norm effect being merely a pragmatic effect.  
Second, a spate of papers have found a close correspondence between judgments about 
causal attributions and responsibility attributions, including a number of recent papers testing the 
norm effect that have shown that it occurs for both types of attribution and found no statistically 
significant difference between judgments about each. This includes recent studies testing variations 
on the Pen Case discussed above (Sytsma forthcoming-a), the Email Case tested below (Sytsma 
forthcoming-a, ms-b; Sytsma and Schwenkler ms), the Machine Case (see Hitchcock and Knobe 
2009; Sytsma forthcoming-b), and the Motion Detector Case (see Kominsky et al. 2015; Sytsma 
ms-a). Further, not only have responses for causal attributions and responsibility attributions been 
found to be statistically indistinguishable when presenting the attributions between-subjects 
(Sytsma and Livengood forthcoming; Sytsma forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b, ms-a), but also when 
presenting them within-subjects, either on alternating pages (Schwenkler and Sytsma ms) or 
together on the same page (Sytsma forthcoming-b, ms-b). If the norm effect is due to pragmatic 
factors leading participants to interpret the causal queries as intending to elicit a normative 
judgment rather than the dominant descriptive use, then the effect should be notably diminished 
when participants are also given a normative attribution: pragmatic considerations should now 
promote interpreting the two attributions as intending to elicit different judgments. But that is not 




2. Causal Judgments 
The second point of disagreement that requires clarification concerns the scope of the “causal 
judgments” to be explained. As noted above, key examples of the norm effect in the literature have 
employed questions using the lemma “cause,” prominently including the statements tested by 
Knobe and Fraser (2008), which were of the form “X caused Y.”3 A central question, then, is 
whether the main accounts of the norm effect in the literature are principally aiming to explain the 
impact of norms on causal attributions or hold that this is part of a broader phenomenon that calls 
for explanation.    
Danks et al. (2014, 255) interpret a number of authors involved in the debate as making a 
broad claim, and perhaps as being committed to what they term the Ubiquity Thesis: “Normative 
considerations (broadly construed) influence causal cognition (broadly construed) and are perhaps 
even constitutive of various cognitive processes involved in aspects of causal cognition.” Here, 
“causal cognition (broadly construed)” is taken to include both causal learning and causal 
reasoning, with causal perception and causal inference being counted as part of the former. What 
ties all of these processes together—what appending the adjective “causal” is meant to signify—and 
to what extent each of these processes warrant that adjective are complicated issues that Danks et al. 
do not engage with. Nonetheless, they contend that (at least some subset of) researchers in the 
debate are committed to the Ubiquity Thesis, and they present evidence that the norm effect isn’t 
found for certain “causal” inferences.  
Textual support for researchers being committed to the Ubiquity Thesis is minimal, 
however, with Danks et al. offering just a few quotes that concern “causal judgments” or “causal 
 
3 There are a few exceptions to this general rule, however, such as the use of “made” in a study of children’s 
judgments about the Pen Case by Samland et al. (2016) and the use of “because” in the fourth study by Kominsky et 
al. (2015). See Livengood and Machery (2007), and Livengood et al. (2017) for evidence that “X caused Y” and “Y 
because X” statements at least sometimes come apart, generating different judgments. 
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intuitions.” But these phrases could themselves be interpreted either broadly or narrowly, depending 
on how one understands the intent of “causal.” More narrowly, “causal” can be understood first and 
foremost as reflecting the ordinary use of the lemma “cause.” In fact, while Sytsma et al. (2012) are 
cited as an example of the broad claim, we only ever meant to be making a narrow claim: we focus 
on “the use of causal language” (814)—on how likely people are to “say that an agent… caused an 
outcome” (815). And this is made clearer still in subsequent work where we explicitly state that we 
are concerned with causal attributions (e.g., Livengood et al. 2017, Sytsma et al. 2019, Livengood 
and Sytsma 2020). 
 While focusing on the narrower claim about the ordinary use of the lemma “cause” might be 
taken to limit the interest of the norm effect, as Danks et al. in fact suggest, there are good reasons 
for this narrow focus. First, the primary aim of the responsibility account is to explain the effect 
shown in studies like that seen above for the Pen Case, and such studies have overwhelmingly 
tested causal attributions. Second, we take it to be standard in philosophical discussions to assume 
that the ordinary concept of causation is at least expressed by the dominant attributional use of the 
lemma “cause.” For example, Paul and Hall (2003, 2) focus on “our folk-theoretical notion of 
‘cause’,” while Skow (2019) writes that “the most fundamental causal locution is ‘X caused Y to Z 
by Ving’” (18), although he notes that the “by Ving” is grammatically optional (138). As such, if 
our account of the norm effect is correct—if we are correct that the ordinary concept of causation 
expressed by the dominant attributional use of “cause” is a normative concept—then this has 
notable implications for the philosophical discussions. Further, it would raise concerns about the 
sense in which “causal cognition (broadly construed)” is best considered causal if much of what is 
included diverges from the ordinary use of the root term.  
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 It is unclear whether any of the participants in the present debate are committed to the 
Ubiquity Thesis. But this is itself problematic: it is unclear whether the Ubiquity Thesis applies 
because authors have often been unclear on what they take the scope of the norm effect to be. 
Further, even if the accounts at issue fall short of the broad claim given by the Ubiquity Thesis, 
there are nonetheless differences in how broad different researchers take the norm effect to be, and 
this corresponds with substantive differences in the types of explanations that have been offered.  
The responsibility account is a narrow account in this regard, focusing on causal attributions 
and offering a linguistic/conceptual explanation of the phenomenon. Our account does not rule out 
that a similar effect might be found for other judgments, but neither does it make any specific 
predictions about them: it allows (of course) that the dominant use of some terms is descriptive, 
while the dominant use of others is normative. That said, we do expect that the range of terms 
typically used in a normative way might be surprising to many philosophers. And this is in accord 
with the underlying motivation for our responsibility account, as laid out in Sytsma (forthcoming-
a): human cognition is generally quite attuned to recognizing applicable norms, detecting and 
responding to violations, and navigating factors that might exacerbate or mitigate those violations. 
In contrast, the pragmatic, bias, and counterfactual accounts are broad accounts with regard 
to the judgments at issue for the norm effect. First, as seen above, the pragmatic account holds that 
the studies on the norm effect induce participants to interpret the queries as intending to ask a 
normative rather than a descriptive question. But we would expect the same pragmatic pressures to 
hold for other terms that plausibly express causality (as Samland and Waldmann understand it). 
Second, the bias and counterfactual accounts both hold that the ordinary concept of causation is 
normative but that an underlying mechanism leads it to be applied in a normative way, producing 
the norm effect. And while they differ with regard to the underlying mechanism that they posit, in 
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each case the mechanism would be expected to reveal itself across a wider range of judgments than 
just those involving “cause.” 
 The bias account contends that the norm effect comes about because the differential 
desire to blame (or praise) one of the agents leads people to exaggerate that agent’s contribution 
to bringing about the outcome, pulling their causal judgments concerning that agent toward their 
blame (or praise) judgments. In other words, Alicke and colleagues hold that the desire to blame 
(or praise) biases the application of the descriptive concept of causation, generating judgments 
that are sensitive to normative considerations. As Rose (2017, 1327) puts it, the norm effect 
reflects “an error, rooted in a motivational bias to blame those who engage in harmful or 
offensive actions.” Counterfactual accounts point to a different cognitive mechanism to explain 
the norm effect. Focusing on the account put forward by Hitchcock and Knobe (2009), they hold 
that norms impact which counterfactuals people find relevant, and hence which counterfactuals 
they are most likely to consider. They then contend that the process by which people arrive at 
causal judgments works through the counterfactuals that they consider and, hence, that norms 
impact causal judgments only indirectly. 
 While the recent debate has in large part centered on judgments about statements using 
the lemma “cause,” the explanations offered by the pragmatic, bias, and counterfactual accounts 
are not specific to such judgments: the mechanisms underpinning these explanations should 
reveal themselves in a larger class of judgments, presumably including judgments about other 
phrases that might be taken to express a descriptive causality relation (e.g., “created,” “induced,” 
“led to,” “linked to,” “because of”), and perhaps also counterfactual constructions (e.g., “if 
Professor Smith had not taken a pen, the problem would not have occurred”), statements 
involving lexical causatives (e.g., “Billy deleted the e-mails”), or causal inferences. There is 
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currently a paucity of evidence suggesting that the norm effect consistently occurs across the 
range of judgments these views might predict, however, and some evidence that it does not. This 
includes the corpus evidence noted above (Sytsma et al. 2019), mixed results for “because” 
statements (see Footnote 3), evidence in this volume concerning causatives (Schwenkler and 
Sievers forthcoming), and studies on causal inference (Danks et al. 2014).  
 The bias and counterfactual accounts should be expected to make predictions about a 
broader range of judgments because they explain the norm effect in terms of an underlying 
mechanism that isn’t specific to judgments involving the lemma “cause.” And these mechanisms 
generate a number of further predictions that have not been borne out by the present data. First, 
like the pragmatic account, the bias and counterfactual accounts have difficulty explaining the 
close correspondence between judgments about causal attributions and judgments about 
responsibility attributions noted in the previous section (Sytsma forthcoming-a). While the bias 
account would predict some correspondence between these judgments, to explain the extremely 
close correspondence found across a range of studies would require positing an implausibly 
strong bias. The basic worry for counterfactual accounts is a bit different: these accounts would 
seem to hold that there are two different mechanisms at play—the sensitivity of causal judgments 
to normative considerations being explained indirectly via the counterfactuals we consider while 
the sensitivity of responsibility judgments to normative considerations is explained directly in 
terms of responsibility being a normative concept—but it is implausible that two different 
mechanisms would produce statistically indistinguishable effects across a range of cases.  
 Second, the general mechanism posited by the bias account rests on people’s “desire to 
praise or denigrate those whose actions we applaud or deride” (Alicke et al. 2011, 670). Such 
desires should be aroused not just by features of agents that are relevant to appropriately 
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assessing their responsibility for an outcome, however, but also by “peripheral features of the 
event such as the actor’s or victim’s race or character” (674). And while information pertinent to 
assessing an agent’s general character does have an impact on causal attributions, recent studies 
indicate that this effect is not driven by the desire to denigrate, but by an inference to the agent’s 
knowledge and desires in performing the action, such that when the agent’s knowledge and 
desires are made clear, peripheral features of the agent no longer show an effect (Sytsma ms-c).  
 Third, the general mechanism posited by counterfactual accounts hinges on the overall 
normality of the actions described (as discussed further in the next section), but a pair of recent 
papers find that causal attributions sometimes diverge from what would be predicted on the basis 
of norms alone. First, Sytsma and Livengood (forthcoming) argue that sometimes acting in 
accord with the relevant norms renders the actor responsible for a negative outcome that results. 
We suggest that the switch version of the trolley problem is one such case: while popular 
sentiment holds that the agent ought to flip the switch, saving five innocents at the expense of 
one, it also seems that in doing so the agent shares in the responsibility for the one person’s death 
since that person was in no danger prior to the agent’s intervention. And what we find is that 
causal judgments for this case are similar to both people’s normative judgments and their 
responsibility judgments, with ratings for each being higher when the agent flips the switch than 
when the agent refrains. This is in line with the responsibility account, but runs counter to 
counterfactual accounts, which would expect an inverse relationship between normative 
judgments and causal judgments. Second, according to counterfactual accounts, the valence of 
the outcome should not matter for causal judgments—just the normality of the actions. But 
Schwenkler and Sytsma (ms) have found that the norm effect is also reversed when the norm-
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conforming agent knowingly acts to bring about a good outcome, while the norm-violating agent 
acts for malicious reasons. 
 
3. Norms 
The third point of disagreement that requires clarification concerns the scope of the norms at issue 
for the norm effect. The prototypical examples from the literature, such as the Pen Case, involve 
agents violating explicit rules, such as when Professor Smith takes a pen in violation of department 
policy. This is an example of a proscriptive norm: a norm specifying what ought not to be done. 
The compliment of proscriptive norms are prescriptive norms: norms that specify what ought to be 
done. Together these can be referred to as injunctive norms.4 
 Injunctive norms are in line with standard discussions of normativity in philosophy and 
psychology, which have generally focused on our ability to recognize and enforce oughts. For 
instance, Darwall (2001) opens his Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Normativity” 
by stating the issue in just this way, writing that “normative judgments concern oughts: what one 
ought to do, desire, believe, infer, conclude, think, feel and so on.” The implicit or explicit rules 
corresponding with such oughts are then standardly referred to as “norms.” As Kelly and Setman 
(2020) summarize in their Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “The Psychology of 
Normative Cognition”: 
Norms are the social rules that mark out what is appropriate, allowed, required, or forbidden 
in different situations for various community members. These rules are informal in the sense 
that although they are sometimes represented in formal laws, such as the rule governing 




4 Note that the expression “prescriptive norm” is often used in the literature to refer to what I here term injunctive 
norms, including both prescriptive and proscriptive norms. 
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One thing to note here is that the norms at issue are not restricted to those oughts that we are likely 
to classify as distinctively moral. Although debate rages concerning how to classify norms (see 
O’Neill 2017), including how to distinguish between moral and non-moral norms, the key point for 
present purposes is that while normativity covers moral norms, it is not exhausted by them. And 
similarly for injunctive norms. 
 The pragmatic, bias, and responsibility accounts all operate on this standard understanding 
of norms where they’re tied to oughts. As suggested by Danks et al.’s focus on “normative 
considerations (broadly construed)” in their statement of the Ubiquity Thesis discussed above, 
however, some participants in the debate have embraced a more expansive notion of norms. 
Specifically, counterfactual accounts operate on a broad conception of normality. To illustrate, 
Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) distinguish between two meanings for the term “norm.” The first 
corresponds with injunctive norms: these are “norms that actually tell us what ought to happen 
under certain circumstances” and include “purely moral norms, where violating the norm would be 
intrinsically wrong” in addition to more general norms including legal norms and “norms arising 
from policies adopted by social institutions,” as well as norms of proper functioning that “apply to 
artifacts and biological organisms (and their components)” (597-598). Hitchcock and Knobe’s 
second meaning for “norm” diverges from the sense laid out above, however, instead concerning 
what is typical or atypical. They refer to these as statistical norms and write that “these norms 
simply capture information about the relative frequencies of certain events” (597). As such, 
statistical norms are descriptive, while injunctive norms are normative (in the standard sense).  
 Counterfactual accounts like that given by Hitchcock and Knobe hold that the type of norm 
doesn’t matter—that causal judgments are sensitive to both violations of injunctive norms and 
violations of statistical norms. In contrast, when I say that according to our responsibility account 
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the dominant use of causal attributions employs a normative concept, this is specific to injunctive 
norms: we hold that causal attributions are directly sensitive to injunctive norms. That said, our 
account predicts that statistical norms will sometimes also impact causal attributions, although we 
hold that they do so indirectly, with statistical norms sometimes impacting our judgments about 
injunctive norms (Sytsma et al. 2012, Livengood et al. 2017).  
We expect that impact of statistical norms on causal attributions will work somewhat 
differently for attributions involving agents and attributions involving non-agents (see Sytsma 
forthcoming-a). Focusing on agents, we have presented a body of evidence indicating that 
violations of statistical norms do not impact causal attributions in the same way that violations of 
injunctive norms do for scenarios like the Pen Case (Sytsma et al. 2012, Livengood et al. 2017, 
Sytsma forthcoming-a). Instead we’ve shown a striking pattern of findings that run counter to the 
predictions of counterfactual accounts but were predicted on the basis of our responsibility account. 
First, we found that causal attributions are insensitive to one type of statistical norm—population-
level statistical norms, which concern what is typical or atypical for members of a relevant 
population to which the agent belongs. Second, we found that causal attributions are sensitive to 
another type of statistical norm—agent-level statistical norms, which concern what is typical or 
atypical for the agent herself—but only when the norm-violating agent knows about the likely 
outcome of her action; and, in such cases we found that the “norm effect” runs in the opposite 
direction to that observed for violations of injunctive norms, with causal ratings being higher when 
the agent acts typically than when she acts atypically.  
Our predictions about these effects were based on thinking about responsibility 
judgments. Reflecting on the responsibility attributions that we would make, we expected that 
violations of population-level statistical norms would have little to no impact on causal 
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attributions for scenarios like the Pen Case. We reasoned that excuses like “everyone was doing 
it” aren’t generally taken to be good excuses and, as such, would not mitigate an agent’s 
responsibility for a bad outcome. By contrast, for agent-level statistical norms we expected that 
causal ratings would be higher when the action is typical of the agent and when she knows that 
she is doing something she shouldn’t and that a bad outcome might result. We reasoned that 
when the agent can be expected to know that a bad outcome might result from her behavior, 
people will be more likely to see her as being responsible for the outcome when she typically 
acts in this reckless way. Here it would just seem to be a matter of time before the agent brings 
about the outcome, blocking consideration of potential mitigating factors. While these 
predictions were based on the responsibility judgments that we would make, I’ve recently shown 
that the same complex pattern of effects found for causal attributions is also found for 
responsibility attributions in a broader sample (Sytsma forthcoming-a). In fact, as noted above, 
ratings for the two types of attributions were not statistically significantly distinguishable. 
Summing up, while each of the main accounts on offer in the recent literature propose to 
explain the norm effect, they diverge with regard to how broad they expect this phenomenon to 
be, and do so along at least three dimensions—diverging with regard to the contexts that will 
elicit the effect, the judgments involved in the effect, and the norms that will give rise to it. 
These differences are summarized in Table 1. But, as sketched above, these assumptions about 
the extent of the norm effect are not all equally supported by the present data, and the details of 
the accounts shaping their treatment of the scope of the effect give rise to a number of further 
predictions that have not been borne out by subsequent studies. Perhaps most notably, while the 
close correspondence between judgments about causal attributions and responsibility attributions 
found in recent studies is directly predicted by our responsibility account, it is tough to 
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convincingly reconcile with the competing accounts in the literature. To conclude this chapter, I 
expand on these findings, presenting the results of two new studies that further demonstrate that 
people tend to treat causal attributions and normative attributions as going together. 
 Context Judgments Norms 
Pragmatic Narrow Broad Narrow 
Responsibility Broad Narrow Narrow 
Bias Broad Broad Narrow 
Counterfactual Broad Broad Broad 
 
Table 1: Summary of the scope of the norm effect for each view along the dimensions 




4. Rank Ordering Compound Statements 
In this section I extend the previous findings showing a close correspondence between judgments 
about causal attributions and responsibility attributions, presenting the results of two 
preregistered studies (osf.io/fpwq3/) using a novel design: rather than asking participants about 
separate attributions, I asked them to rank order compound statements involving both a causal 
attribution and a normative attribution—either responsibility (Study 1a) or blame (Study 1b).  
 
4.1 Method 
Each participant read the following vignette in which two agents perform actions that are 
symmetric, outside of one violating an injunctive norm (Billy) while the other does not (Suzy), 
and in so doing jointly bringing about a bad outcome: 
Billy and Suzy work for a company that has a central computer. 
In order to make sure that one person is always available to answer incoming phone calls, 
the company issued the following official policy: Billy is the only one permitted to log 
into the central computer in the afternoons, whereas Suzy is the only one permitted to log 
into the central computer in the mornings. Billy is never permitted to log into the central 




Unfortunately, a problem has recently developed with the computer system: if two people 
log into the computer in the morning, some important work e-mails will be immediately 
deleted.  
 
This morning, Billy and Suzy both log into the central computer at the same time. 
Immediately, some important work e-mails are deleted.5 
 
After reading the vignette, participants were given two rank-ordering questions in random order, 
one about Billy and one about Suzy, followed by a comprehension check (“How many people 
need to log into the central computer in the morning for the e-mails to be deleted?” with options 
of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more). All questions were presented on the same page. 
The rank-ordering questions each included four compound statements involving a causal 
attribution and a normative attribution, with the order of the two attributions being varied in the 
statements. To illustrate, the first ordering of the question about Billy in Study 1a read as follows 
(letters are added for convenience and were not presented to participants): 
Please rank the following four claims about Billy in order of how much you agree with 
them, with (1) being the claim you most strongly agree with and (4) being the claim you 
most strongly disagree with: 
 
[A] Billy did not cause the e-mails to be deleted and Billy is not responsible for the e-
mails being deleted. 
[B] Billy did not cause the e-mails to be deleted but Billy is responsible for the e-mails 
being deleted. 
[C] Billy caused the e-mails to be deleted but Billy is not responsible for the e-mails 
being deleted. 
[D] Billy caused the e-mails to be deleted and Billy is responsible for the e-mails being 
deleted. 
 
In the second ordering, the normative attributions preceded the causal attributions. For example, 
the second ordering for [D] would now read: “Billy is responsible for the e-mails being deleted 
 
5 The vignette is based on the computer case presented by Knobe (2006) and discussed in Sytsma et al. (2012), and 
is similar to the variations tested by Reuter et al. (2014), Kominsky et al. (2015), and Livengood et al. (2017), 
showing the expected norm effect with Likert-scale ratings of causal attributions. Further variations have been tested 
by Icard et al. (2017), Sytsma (forthcoming), Sytsma and Livengood (forthcoming), and Schwenkler and Sytsma 
(ms), among others.  
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and Billy caused the e-mails to be deleted.” The questions about Suzy were identical, except for 
“Suzy” replacing each instance of “Billy.” Similarly, the questions in Study 1b were identical to 
those in Study 1a, except for “to blame” replacing each instance of “responsible.” For each 
question, the order of the four options was randomized.  
 Participants for each study were recruited through advertising for a free personality test on 
Google with the ads being displayed in North America.6 Prior to the test questions, participants 
answered basic demographic questions. After the test questions they took a 10-item Big Five 
personality inventory. Participants were restricted to native English speakers, 16 years of age or 
older, who indicated that they had not previously taken the survey, and who completed the three 
test questions. Results were collected from 200 participants who met the restrictions and passed 
the comprehension check (100 per study and 50 per condition).7 These participants were 73.0% 
women (three non-binary) with an average age of 46.7 years and ranging in age from 16 to 80. 
 
4.2 Predictions 
The responsibility account predicts that there will still be a pronounced norm effect for the causal 
attributions in these studies, despite participants now being able to clearly register their 
normative judgments. As such, I predict that for the norm-violating agent, Billy, participants will 
tend to rank one of the two statements affirming causation ([C], [D]) in first place and to rank 
 
6 One notable benefit of using a “push strategy” like this one (i.e., recruiting participants who were not directly 
looking to participate in research) is that participants are more likely to be “experimentally naïve” and less likely to 
be motivated to provide the responses that they think the experimenters are looking for (Haug 2018). Samples 
collected using the recruitment strategy employed here have been previously compared against samples collected 
with other methods in replication studies. And the present strategy has been consistently found to generate a diverse 
sample in terms of geography, socio-economic status, religiosity, political orientation, age, and education. Studies 
using this strategy have been previously reported in publications including, e.g., Livengood et al. (2010), Feltz and 
Cokely (2011), Sytsma and Machery (2012), Murray et al. (2013), Machery et al. (2015), Kim et al. (2016), 
Livengood and Rose (2016), Sytsma and Reuter (2017), Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019), Reuter and Sytsma (2020), 
Fischer et al. (forthcoming), Fischer and Sytsma (forthcoming). 
7 53/253 (20.9%) of participants failed the check question. 
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one of the two statements denying causation ([A], [B]) in last place; and I predict that the 
opposite pattern will be found for the norm-conforming agent, Suzy. In addition, the 
responsibility account predicts that participants will treat the causal attributions and the 
normative attributions similarly, showing a stronger preference/dispreference for the “and” 
statements compared to the “but” statements. More specifically, I predict that for Billy 
participants will tend to show the strongest preference for [D] and the strongest dispreference for 
[A], while for Suzy they will tend to show the strongest preference for [A] and the strongest 
dispreference for [D].  
The pragmatic account makes contrasting predictions. According to this view, when 
asking about compound attributions we would expect pragmatic considerations to lead 
participants to read “caused” and “responsible”/“blame” in contrasting senses since this would 
make the claims more informative, whereas reading them in the same sense would render them 
redundant. As such, advocates of the pragmatic account should expect the norm effect for causal 
attributions to largely disappear, with participants interpreting “caused” in the (supposedly) 
dominant descriptive sense. While Samland and Waldmann (2016, 165) claim that “the causal 
relations are trivial” for cases like this, as noted above, it is in fact unclear whether we would 
expect people to hold that both agents caused the outcome or that neither agent caused the 
outcome on a purely descriptive reading. If the former, then their pragmatic account would predict 
that people will show the strongest preference for [D] for Billy and the strongest preference for 
[C] for Suzy, judging that while both caused the outcome, Billy but not Suzy is responsible for (to 
blame for) the outcome. If the latter, then they would predict that people will show the strongest 
preference for [B] for Billy and the strongest preference for [A] for Suzy, judging that while 











Rank orderings are shown in Figure 1. To analyze the results, I used the pmr package in R (Lee 
and Yu 2013). I began by comparing the marginal frequencies between Studies 1a and 1b for 
each of the two rank-ordering questions. That is, for each of the two agents, I compared the 
number of participants ranking each statement ([A]-[D]) in each position (1st-4th) between the 
two studies. The marginal frequencies were not significantly different for either Billy (χ2=19.58, 
df=15, p=.19) or Suzy (χ2=14.17, df=15, p=.51). In other words, the results were comparable 
whether combining causal attributions with responsibility attributions or with blame attributions. 
As such, I will collapse the two studies in the subsequent analysis. The same procedure was used 
to check for order effects, comparing marginal frequencies for each agent between the condition 
where the causal attribution was given first in each compound statement and the condition where 
it was given second. A significant order effect was found for the rankings for both Billy 
(χ2=44.76, df=15, p<.001) and Suzy (χ2=25.79, df=15, p=.040). As such, differences between the 
two orderings will be noted below. In brief, what we find is that the ordering impacted the 
relative preference for statements [B] and [C], but not [A] and [D]. 
To test whether the norm effect previously found for variations on the Email Case using 
Likert items replicates for the rank ordering questions, I began by comparing the marginal 
frequencies between the rank orderings for the two agents. There was a significant difference 
(χ2=368.02 df=15, p<.001). More importantly, a significant majority of participants ranked one 
of the two items stating that the norm-violating agent, Billy, caused the outcome ([C], [D]) in 
first place (82.5%; χ2=83.20, df=1, p<.001) and a significant majority ranked one of the two 
items denying that Billy caused the outcome ([A], [B]) in last place (72%; χ2=37.84, df=1, 
p<.001). And the opposite was found for the norm-conforming agent, Suzy: a significant 
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majority of participants ranked one of the two items denying that Suzy caused the outcome in 
first place (77.5%; χ2=59.40, df=1, p<.001) and a significant majority of participants ranked one 
of the two items affirming that Suzy caused the outcome in last place (78.5%; χ2=63.84, df=1, 
p<.001).8 Thus, despite having options to register that Billy was responsible (to blame) for the 
outcome and that Suzy was not responsible (to blame) for the outcome, the norm effect was still 
in clear evidence, with participants preferring to say that Billy caused the outcome and 
participants preferring to say that Suzy did not cause the outcome. This runs strongly counter to 
what we would expect on the basis of the pragmatic account. 
Looking more closely at the rankings for Billy, the mean ranks again suggest a clear 
preference for [D] and dispreference for [A], while [C] and [B] are similar: [A] 3.38, [B] 2.44, 
[C] 2.42, [D] 1.76.9 This was confirmed by looking at the pairwise frequencies. A significant 
majority or participants ranked [D] higher than [A] (82%; χ2=80.64, df=1, p<.001), higher than 
[B] (72%; χ2=37.84, df=1, p<.001), and higher than [C] (70%; χ2=31.20, df=1, p<.001). 
Similarly, a significant majority of participants ranked [A] lower than [B] (78%; χ2=61.60, df=1, 
p<.001) and lower than [C] (77.5%; χ2=59.40, df=1, p<.001). Finally, a very slight majority of 
participants ranked [C] higher than [B] (50.5%; χ2=.005, df=1, p=.94). Further, a significant 
majority of participants ranked [D] first (62.5%; χ2=12.00, df=1, p<.001) and a significant 
 
8 Similar results held for the first ordering (caused first), with a significant majority ranking [C] or [D] in first place 
for Billy (82%; χ2=39.69, df=1, p<.001), a significant majority ranking [A] or [B] in last place for Billy (74%; 
χ2=22.09, df=1, p<.001), a significant majority ranking [A] or [B] in first place for Suzy (74%; χ2=22.09, df=1, 
p<.001), and a significant majority ranking [C] or [D] in last place for Suzy (77%; χ2=28.09, df=1, p<.001). And 
likewise for the second ordering (caused second), with a significant majority ranking [C] or [D] in first place for 
Billy (83%; χ2=42.25, df=1, p<.001), a significant majority ranking [A] or [B] in last place for Billy (70%; χ2=15.21, 
df=1, p<.001), a significant majority ranking [A] or [B] in first place for Suzy (81%; χ2=37.21, df=1, p<.001), and a 
significant majority ranking [C] or [D] in last place for Suzy (80%; χ2=34.81, df=1, p<.001).   
9 Mean ranks are similar for the first ordering ([A] 3.27, [B] 2.66, [C] 2.40, [D] 1.67) and the second ordering ([A] 
3.48, [B] 2.23, [C] 2.44, [D] 1.85), although the relative order of [B] and [C] is shifted.  
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majority ranked [A] last (62%; χ2=11.04, df=1, p<.001). Thus, the rankings for Billy confirm the 
prediction of the responsibility account.  
The rankings for Billy also confirm the prediction of pragmatic accounts, on the 
assumption that for a purely descriptive reading of “caused” participants will judge that both 
agents caused the outcome. As such, the pragmatic account would then make a different 
prediction from the responsibility account for Suzy (i.e., pragmatic accounts would predict that 
participants will show the strongest preference for [C] and the strongest dispreference for [B]). If 
the pragmatic account instead predicted that participants would judge that neither agent caused 
the outcome, then the results for Billy run strongly counter to the prediction for this type of view: 
only a small minority ranked [B] first (9.5%; χ2=129.6, df=1, p<.001) and only a small minority 
ranked [C] last (12.5%; χ2=111, df=1, p<.001). 
To further test for the preferred ordering for Billy, I used a weighted distance-based 
model with Spearman’s footrule as the distance measure (Lee and Yu 2012). The modal ranking 
given is [D] < [B] < [C] < [A], with parameter estimates of 0.46, 0.59, 0.13, and 0.55 
(loglikelihood=532.17). The model was a good fit for the data as indicated by the sum of squares 
Pearson residuals (χ2=91.34, df=24, p<.001). The same modal ranking was given for the Luce 
model and distance-based model, although the ϕ-component model reversed the order of [B] and 
[C].10 As noted above, the relative order of preference for these two statements differed between 
the orderings: when the causal attribution was first in the statements, all four models showed a 
modal ranking of [D] < [C] < [B] < [A], with participants showing a relative preference for the 
 
10 A pilot study (N=70) using the same design as Study 1a, but with the check question given on a second page with 
additional questions, showed this alternative ordering for Billy ([D] > [C] > [B] > [A]) for the mean ranks ([A] 3.56, 
[B] 2.60, [C] 2.34, [D] 1.50) and all four models. And it showed the reverse ordering for Suzy ([A] > [B] > [C] > 
[D]) for the mean ranks ([A] 1.71, [B] 2.41, [C] 2.56, [D] 3.31) and all four models. Outside of the ordering of [B] 
and [C] the results were quite similar to those reported here; in fact, the marginal frequencies were not significantly 
different between the pilot and Study 1a for either Billy (χ2=17.83, df=15, p=.27) or Suzy (χ2=22.12, df=15, p=.10).  
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“but” statement affirming the causal attribution ([C]) over the “but” statement denying the causal 
attribution ([B]); but when the normative attribution was first, all four models showed a modal 
ranking where these were reversed ([D] > [B] > [C] > [A]). Overall, the rankings suggest that 
participants did not have a strong preference between the “but” items, which is in keeping with 
the strong preference shown for affirming both attributions and the strong dispreference shown 
for denying both attributions. 
Turning to the question about the norm-conforming agent, Suzy, we find a quite different 
pattern of results, with the mean ranks suggesting the opposite order of preference from that seen 
for Billy: [A] 1.58, [B] 2.62, [C] 2.39, [D] 3.42.11 This was again confirmed by looking at the 
pairwise frequencies. A significant majority or participants ranked [A] higher than [B] (84%; 
χ2=91.12, df=1, p<.001), higher than [C] (74%; χ2=45.12, df=1, p<.001), and higher than [D] 
(84.5%; χ2=93.84, df=1, p<.001). Similarly, a significant majority of participants ranked [D] 
lower than [B] (78%; χ2=61.60, df=1, p<.001) and lower than [C] (79.5%; χ2=68.44, df=1, 
p<.001). Finally, a slight majority of participants ranked [C] higher than [B] (55.5%; χ2=2.20, 
df=1, p=.14, two-tailed). Further, a significant majority of participants ranked [A] first (67.5%; 
χ2=23.80, df=1, p<.001) and a significant majority ranked [D] last (67%; χ2=22.45, df=1, 
p<.001). Thus, the rankings for Suzy confirm the prediction of the responsibility account. 
The rankings for Suzy also confirm the prediction of the pragmatic account, on the 
assumption that for a purely descriptive reading of “caused” participants will judge that neither 
agent caused the outcome. But this assumption would then generate the opposite prediction to 
the responsibility account for Billy, which runs counter to the findings detailed above. If the 
pragmatic account instead predicts that participants will judge that both agents caused the 
 
11 Mean ranks are similar for the first ordering ([A] 1.63, [B] 2.54, [C] 2.52, [D] 3.30) and the second ordering ([A] 
1.51, [B] 2.69, [C] 2.26, [D] 3.54).  
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outcome, then the results for Suzy run strongly counter to the prediction of this type of view: 
only a small minority ranked [C] first (13%; χ2=108.04, df=1, p<.001) and only a small minority 
ranked [B] last (17%; χ2=85.80, df=1, p<.001). In other words, whichever prediction the 
pragmatic account makes about the supposedly “trivial” descriptive relations, the rankings for 
one of the two agents will run strongly counter to the prediction. 
To further test for the preferred ordering for Suzy, I again used a weighted distance-based 
model with Spearman’s footrule as the distance measure. The modal ranking given corresponds 
with the mean rank order—[A] > [C] > [B] > [D]—with parameter estimates of 0.58, 0.25, 0.51, 
and 0.63 (loglikelihood=504.30). The model was a good fit for the data as indicated by the sum 
of squares Pearson residuals (χ2=91.34, df=24, p<.001). The same modal ranking was given for 
the Luce model, distance-based model, ϕ-component model. As with the question about Billy, 
however, the relative order of preference for [B] and [C] differed between the orderings: when 
the causal attribution was given first in the statements, all four models showed a modal ranking 
of [A] > [B] > [C] > [D]; but when the normative attribution was instead given first, all four 
models showed a modal ranking where these were reversed ([A] > [C] > [B] > [D]). 
 
4.4 Discussion 
As noted in the previous sections, a key piece of evidence in favor of the responsibility account, 
and against competing accounts, is the close correspondence between causal attributions and 
responsibility attributions. Some of these studies involve judgments solicited between-subjects, 
but some use a within-subjects design. While each is problematic for competing accounts, the 
latter is especially problematic for the pragmatic account. The close correspondence between 
causal attributions and responsibility attributions in the between-subjects studies might be 
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explained in terms of pragmatic factors leading people to rate causal attributions similarly to how 
they would rate responsibility attributions, although the degree of correspondence is an issue for 
this type of view. When asking about the attributions together, however, we would expect the 
proposed pragmatic effect to be notably mitigated. If, for instance, the close correspondence in 
between-subjects studies is due to people interpreting the causal attribution as really asking about 
responsibility or accountability for pragmatic reasons, then we would expect participants to give 
divergent responses when asked about both attributions together: this should tend to promote 
interpreting the causal attribution as being intended in the dominant descriptive sense, according 
to Samland and Waldmann’s reasoning.  
 This reasoning is even more clear for the present studies. In the studies reported in this 
section, participants did not simply rate a causal attribution and a normative attribution at the 
same time, but assessed joint statements combining both types of attributions. That is, assessing 
the statements required assessing both attributions together. And if it is the case that the 
dominant sense of one is purely descriptive, while the other is partly normative, then pragmatic 
considerations should if anything reinforce reading each in the dominant sense since this would 
be maximally informative. But, despite this, we saw that participants showed a marked 
preference for affirming both for the norm-violating agent and denying both for the norm-
conforming agent. This provides strong evidence against the pragmatic view. It appears that the 
norm effect is a general effect, not a pragmatic effect. 
 That the close correspondence between causal attributions and normative attributions 
remains despite pragmatic pressures that would seem to promote interpreting them as making 
different claims is equally strong evidence in favor of the responsibility account: the most 
straightforward explanation is that there is a notable commonalty in how people understand these 
28 
 
attributions, with the dominant use of each being partly normative. In contrast, to explain these 
new findings advocates of the bias account would need to contend that the motivational bias it 
posits is so strong that even when directly comparing the two types of attributions people fail to 
keep them separate, with their desire to blame still infecting their causal judgments. Likewise, to 
explain these new findings advocates of counterfactual accounts would need to contend that the 
effect of norms on the counterfactuals that people consider is so strong that it overrides the 
pragmatic pressures to consider the difference between the two types of attributions, which 
would seem to emphasize the descriptive symmetry between the two agents’ actions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
At this point, it is beyond dispute that the norm effect occurs for causal judgments: a wealth of 
findings shows that information about norms impacts people’s causal judgments. But the extent 
of this phenomenon and, relatedly, how best to explain has been heavily contested. Despite this, I 
believe that answers to these questions are becoming clear. We are not merely dealing with a 
pragmatic effect or an effect that otherwise owes to a general underlying mechanism that leads 
us to apply a purely descriptive concept in a way that appears normative; we are simply dealing 
with the judgments that result from the correct application of a normative concept akin to 
responsibility or accountability. In the face of the present evidence, this is the both the simplest 
and the most charitable explanation, requiring neither the posit of further mechanisms or general 
mistakes. The explanation of the norm effect is simply that we ordinarily use the lemma “cause” 
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